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Schleining v. Cap One, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 36 (May 29, 2014)1 
CONTRACT LAW: DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT 
Summary 
 The Court determined two issues: 1) whether NRS 40.453 invalidates a guarantor’s 
contractual waiver of the statutory right to be mailed a notice of default and 2) whether NRS 
107.095 requires strict or substantial compliance by lenders giving notice of default, and if 
substantial compliance is sufficient, whether there was substantial compliance in this case. 
Disposition 
 The Legislature intended NRS 40.453 to invalidate a guarantor's purported contractual 
waiver of the statutory right to be mailed a notice of default provided in NRS 107.095. 
Substantial compliance can satisfy NRS 107.095's notice of default requirement, and, here, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the lender substantially complied 
with NRS 107.095's notice requirement. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 In May 2007, Decal Nevada, Inc., an entity solely owned by John Schleining, obtained a 
loan from respondent lenders, Cap One, to help pay the purchase price of an undeveloped parcel 
of real property. Schleining signed a personal guaranty of the loan, which included a waiver of 
his right to receive notice of any default of the loan. After Decal defaulted, Cap One declined to 
extend the loan and refused to release Schleining from her personal guaranty. One month later, 
Cap One recorded a notice of default and election to sell. Cap One then mailed a copy of the 
notice of default to Decal at various addresses, including Decal's office in St. Helens, Oregon—
an office Decal shared with Schleining. However, Cap One did not mail a separate copy of the 
notice of default to Schleining as guarantor, as set forth in NRS 107.095. Additionally, Cap One 
mailed a notice of trustee’s sale to Decal, again at Schleining’s shared St. Helens, Oregon, 
address though a notice was not mailed to Schleining, personally. A trustee's sale was held at 
which Cap One was the only bidder on the property, purchasing it for $100,000.  
 Cap One then filed a complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against Schleining as 
guarantor. The district court ruled that Schleining’s contractual waiver of notice was invalid 
pursuant to NRS 40.453. The district court further ruled that, because Schleining had actual 
notice of the default and foreclosure sale and was not prejudiced by the lack of formal notice, 
Cap One had substantially complied with NRS 107.095. Thus, the district court awarded a 
deficiency judgment against Schleining in favor of Cap One. 
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  By Laura Guidry. 
Discussion 
Pursuant to NRS 40.453, Schleining could not waive the right to be mailed the notice of default   
Though not codified in the same subchapter NRS 107.095 (providing borrowers and 
guarantors a right to notice of default) and NRS 40.453 (disallowing contractual waivers of 
certain statutory rights) relate to the same subject matter and were enacted as part of the same 
bill. Accordingly, the Court determined that NRS 107.095 falls within the scope of NRS 40.453's 
prohibited waivers. The district court properly invalidated Schleining's waiver of his right to be 
mailed the notice of default. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Cap One substantially 
complied with the notice requirement in NRS 107.095  
 Given that the Legislature intended for a substantial compliance standard to apply with 
regard to Cap One's duty to provide notice to borrower Decal under NRS 107.080, there is no 
reason why the Legislature would intend for a strict-compliance standard to apply when 
providing the same notice directly to guarantor Schleining under NRS 107.095. The purpose of 
NRS 107.095 is simply to notify the guarantor that the loan is in default and that the lender has 
elected to foreclose on the secured property. Substantial compliance is sufficient where actual 
notice occurs and there is no prejudice to the party entitled to notice.2 The Court found 
Schleining had actual knowledge of the default and the pending foreclosure sale despite the lack 
of statutory notice. Additionally, Schleining was not prejudiced by the lack of statutory notice. 
Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. 
Conclusion 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined Schleining’s actual 
notice of the default and foreclosure sale, coupled with the lack of prejudice, satisfied the 
purpose of NRS 107.095. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.  
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  Las Vegas Plywood & Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380, 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982). 
